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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-2789 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
                                    
 v. 
 
ISIAH JORDAN, 
Appellant 
     
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Civil No. 2-17-cr-00486-001) 
District Court Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on 
May 20, 2019  
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 29, 2019) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 
2 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
In this appeal,1 Isiah Jordan challenges the district court’s conclusion that his prior 
conviction for second-degree sexual assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1 is a “crime 
of violence” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). That section defines a crime of violence, in 
relevant part, as any federal or state offense punishable by more than one year in prison 
“that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another,” or “(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, 
aggravated assault [or] a forcible sex offense . . . .”2 Second-degree sexual assault is 
defined in Pennsylvania as “engag[ing] in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse 
with a complainant without the complainant’s consent.”3 The district court concluded that 
second-degree sexual assault was a crime of violence and, accordingly, calculated 
Jordan’s sentence with an enhanced base offense level.4  
In so deciding, the court also concluded that “the sentence that [it] would reach 
today . . . will be the same regardless of [the] decision [it] made on the enhancement, on 
the definition of a crime of violence.”5 The district court, thus, provided two grounds for 
                                              
1 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Where, as here, the defendant raised the 
alleged sentencing error before the District Court, we review the sentence for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2009). 
2 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 
3 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1. 
4 With the enhancement, Jordan’s total offense level was calculated at 19 and the 
resulting guidelines range was 37 – 46 months’ imprisonment. He argues that without the 
sentencing enhancement his total offense level would have been 13 and the resulting 
guidelines range 18 – 24 months’ imprisonment.  
5 App. 226. 
 
 
 
3 
its sentence. It failed, however, to explain its reasons for the alternative ground for its 
sentence – namely, why it would impose the same sentence without the crime of violence 
enhancement – as required by, for example, United States v. Smalley,6 and United States 
v. Carter.7 We will vacate the district court’s judgment and remand to the district court to 
elaborate on the alternative ground for the sentence imposed.  
                                              
6 517 F.3d 208, 214 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). 
7 730 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2013). 
